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Abstract
While the leverage theory of bundling usually considers a monopolist in one market
trying to extend its market power to a second competitive market, bundling is in fact
often performed by firms that are dominant but not monopolists. We study bundling
by a dominant multi-product firm facing competition from a rival multi-product firm.
When we compare competition under independent pricing with competition un-
der pure bundling, we find that for low (high) levels of dominance, bundling reduces
(increases) each firm’s profit, while for intermediate levels of dominance, bundling in-
creases the dominant firm’s profit but reduces the rival’s profit. When we allow for
mixed bundling, we find a threshold level of dominance above which the unique out-
come is the one under pure bundling.
Hence, for an intermediate level of dominance, pure bundling is credible, profitable
and builds a barrier to entry, while for large levels of dominance, building an entry
barrier requires pre-commitment to independent pricing. This finding contrasts starkly
with Whinston’s (1990) mechanism based on pre-commitment to pure bundling.
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1 Introduction
Does bundling (or tying) soften or intensify competition? Does bundling build a barrier
to entry? These are two classic questions related to bundling: the first is analyzed in the
literature on competitive bundling and the second in the literature on leverage theory of
tying. The leverage theory is often defined as one about a monopolist leveraging its market
power in the tying good to the tied product to monopolize the second.1 In reality, however,
there are many cases in which the firm attempting to use bundling is not a pure monopolist
in any single market but rather a dominant firm in at least one market. Then, bundling
may be used to transfer market power from one market to the other, or simply, to increase
it overall market power. To the best of our knowledge, the existing theory of competitive
bundling has not studied asymmetry in terms of dominance. In this paper, we study bundling
of a dominant multi-product firm, oﬀer a novel contribution to the theory of competitive
bundling and use it to generate new insights with regards to the leverage theory of tying.
Even if a firm has a legal monopoly over its product granted from patents or copyrights,
this product often faces competition from another product. For instance, consider the three
most publicized recent cases of bundling or incompatibility: bundling of aircraft engine and
avionics in the GE/Honeywell case, Microsoft’s bundling of Windows and Internet Explorer,
and Microsoft’s making Windows incompatible with Operation Systems (OS) of rival com-
panies in the market for work group servers. In the proposed merger of GE and Honeywell,
GE was supposed to have 52.5% market share in the engine market and Honeywell 50-60%
in avionics. Even in the two Microsoft cases, Windows was supposed to have 90% market
share in the OS market for Intel-compatible PCs.2 Furthermore, if we consider the two orig-
inal Supreme Court cases, which first adopted the doctrine of leverage theory to make block
booking (i.e. bundling of movies) per se illegal, these cases are about licensing movies to
movie theaters (U.S. v. Paramount Pictures, 1948) or to TV stations (U.S. v Loew’s, 1962).
It would be almost but impossible to argue that any of the movie studios or distribution
companies involved in the two cases was a monopoly.3
1For instance, according to Whinston (1990), leverage theory of tying is that "tying provides a mechanism
whereby a firm with monopoly power in one market can use the leverage provided by this power to foreclose
sales in, and thereby monopolize, a second market (p.837)."
2See Evans et al. (2000).
3Obviously, it would make no sense to define each (copyrighted) movie as the relevant market. As long as
1
By contrast, most existing formalized theory of leverage (in particular, Whinston 1990
and Nalebuﬀ 2004) considers a pure monopoly in one market leveraging its monopoly power
to another market. For instance, in his baseline model, Whinston (1990) finds that pre-
commitment to tying induces the incumbent to be aggressive and thereby reduces the profit
of a rival firm in the market of the tied product. Hence, tying may induce a potential entrant
not to enter if there is a fixed cost of entry. Notice however that tying reduces the profit
of the incumbent if entry does occur, and hence is not credible. Nalebuﬀ (2004) finds that
bundling two products reduces the profit of an entrant in a single market in a credible way,
but his result crucially relies on the assumption that the incumbent is a Stackelberg leader
in setting prices. Choi and Stefanadis (2001) and Carlton and Waldman (2002) consider a
systemmonopoly and allow for entry in each complementary component but their mechanism
of leverage requires pre-commitment to bundling as in Whinston (1990). We also would like
to note that the leverage theory is closely related to the theory of competitive bundling in
that the former typically studies how bundling aﬀects competition between an incumbent
and an entrant and then derive implications on bundling an en entry barrier.
In this paper, we study bundling of a dominant multi-product firm (called A) facing
competition from a rival multi-product firm (called B)4 and derive implications whether
bundling erects an entry barrier. Motivated by the previous literature on bundling, we ask
the following questions and answer them in terms of the level of A’s dominance:
• When is pure bundling profitable for A when A competes with B? (i.e., when is A’s
profit higher under pure bundling than under independent pricing if bundling does not
deter B’s entry?)
• When does pure bundling build an entry barrier against B? (i.e., when is B’s profit
lower under pure bundling than under independent pricing?)
one accepts that all movies or all movies within each specific category (such as comedy, romance, action etc)
compete in the same market, such monopoly studio or distribution company has never existed in the U.S.
Jeon and Menicucci (2012) analyze bundling when each competing firm sells a portfolio of products (such
as movies) in a common agency setting under complete information.
4Alternatively, we can assume that A competes against specialized firms. The analysis of this case is
similar to the case in which A competes against a multi-product firm except for the fact that pure bundling
of A generates an extra eﬀect in the first case: the specialized firms face a coordination problem when they
choose their prices. To isolate the main eﬀects, we consider the second case.
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• How does mixed bundling aﬀect these results? Is A’s pure bundling credible when
mixed bundling is allowed?
To answer these questions, we consider three diﬀerent simultaneous pricing games: the
game of independent pricing, the game of pure bundling, and the game of mixed bundling.
In our model, each of the two firms produces two products (called 1 and 2). In each product
market, there is both horizontal and vertical diﬀerentiation. To isolate the main eﬀects,
we assume that the markets are symmetric. As we mentioned above, firm A is assumed to
be dominant and we formalize this by supposing that product Aj gives a higher value than
product Bj by α ≥ 0, for j = 1, 2. Thus α is a measure of A’s dominance and is in fact our
key parameter.
We have two sets of novel results. First, when we compare competition under independent
pricing with competition between two pure bundles, we find (i) for low levels of dominance,
bundling reduces each firm’s profit, which generalizes the finding of Matutes and Regibeau
(1988); (ii) for intermediate levels of dominance, bundling increases the dominant firm’s
profit but reduces the rival’s profit; (iii) for high levels of dominance, bundling increases
each firm’s profit. Second, when we allow for mixed bundling, we find a threshold level of
dominance above which the unique equilibrium outcome is the outcome obtained under pure
bundling.
These results imply that for an intermediate level of dominance, pure bundling of firm
A builds a barrier to entry against B and is profitable even though B enters, that is, it
is credible. On the contrary, for very high levels of dominance, bundling does not build a
barrier to entry against B (but it is still profitable for A). In this case, if A had the power to
dictate the terms of competition, the most eﬀective way to deter entry would be to enforce
competition in independent pricing, which is completely opposite to Whinston’s insight.
When we study mixed bundling and dominance is low enough such that pure bundling
is not a unique equilibrium outcome, we have a mixed bundling equilibrium and a pure
bundling equilibrium, and in both equilibria, each firm’s profit is lower than when bundling
is prohibited. Therefore, as far as entry barriers are concerned, firm A does not need pre-
commitment to pure bundling, which clearly shows the diﬀerence between "(mutual) leverage
of dominance"5 and "leverage of monopoly".
5By the way, given that we consider symmetric market, leverage is mutual in that bundling allows to
leverage dominance from market 1 to market 2 and vice versa.
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We generalize a two-dimensional Hotelling model of Matutes and Regibeau (1988) in
two respects. First, we add the vertical diﬀerentiation parameter α introduced above: α =
0 corresponds to their model. Second, we suppose that the consumers’ locations on the
Hotelling line are i.i.d., each with a log-concave symmetric density function; this family
of densities includes the uniform distribution considered by Matutes and Regibeau (1988).
Our main simplifying assumption is full coverage, which means that all consumers are served
under either regime. Hence, the diﬀerence between complements and independent products
does not appear.
The intuition for our first main result regarding pure bundling can be provided in terms
of the following two eﬀects: demand size eﬀect and demand elasticity eﬀect. To explain
demand size eﬀect, suppose that firm A’s products are located at (0,0) and B’s products at
(1,1). Let p∗ij for i = A,B and j = 1, 2 represent the equilibrium price under independent
pricing. A positive α implies that the marginal consumer is located at x (α) ∈ (1/2, 1)
under independent pricing. Under bundling, what matters is the distribution of the average
location, which is more peaked than that of the individual location, in the sense that the
probability of a given size deviation from the mean is smaller for the average location than
for the individual one for any symmetric log-concave density function (Fang and Norman,
2006). Consider now bundling such that firm A charges PA = p∗A1 + p
∗
A2 for the bundle and,
likewise, firm B charges PB = p∗B1 + p∗B2 for the bundle. Then, the average location of the
marginal consumer is still equal to x (α), but the fact that the distribution of the average
location is more peaked than that of the individual location implies that bundling increases
the demand of A (and hence increases A’s profit) and reduces the demand of B.
We now turn to demand elasticity eﬀect. The fact that the distribution of the average
location is more peaked than that of the individual location implies that the demand under
bundling is more elastic (resp. less elastic) if the average location of the marginal consumer is
close to the mean (resp. close to 1). The average location of the marginal consumer is closer
to 1 as firm A’s dominance increases. Therefore, bundling makes A become more aggressive
(less aggressive) if α is smaller than (larger than) some threshold. Since firm A always
benefits from the demand size eﬀect, when α is equal to the threshold, bundling increases
A’s profit but reduces B’ profit. In general, for low levels of dominance the competition-
intensifying demand elasticity eﬀect dominates and hence bundling reduces every firm’s
profit; this generalizes the finding of Matutes and Regibeau (1988) obtained for α = 0.
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Likewise, for high levels of dominance the competition-softening demand elasticity eﬀect
dominates and bundling increases every firm’s profit. For intermediate levels of dominance,
bundling is profitable for A and reduces B’s profit. In Section 3, we establish these results
for symmetric log-concave density functions.
In Section 4, we consider a simultaneous pricing game in which each firm is allowed to
use mixed bundling, and establish that if A is dominant enough then the unique equilibrium
outcome is the outcome obtained under pure bundling. Hence, our results above are not
aﬀected when we allow for mixed bundling. To provide an intuition for this result, note
that pure bundling is always an equilibrium outcome since pure bundling is a best response
to pure bundling. In order to see why it is the unique equilibrium outcome, we prove that
for given prices of B, the problem of firm A boils down to the problem of a two-product
monopolist facing a single consumer with suitably distributed valuations. If the minimum
valuation for each good is large enough, then the monopolist does not use a mixed bundling
strategy, in order to avoid that some types of consumers buy only one object, which would
make him lose a (substantial) profit from selling the other object.6 In the duopoly setting, a
strong dominance of A with respect to B is equivalent to a large minimum valuation in the
monopoly setting, which induces firm A to play a pure bundling strategy.
The bundling (or tying) literature can be divided into three categories.7 The first one
includes the papers that view bundling as a price discrimination device for a monopolist
(Schmalensee, 1984, McAfee et al. 1989, Salinger 1995, Armstrong 1996, Bakos and Bryn-
jolfsson, 1999, Fang and Norman, 2006, Chen and Riordan 2012). The second is about
competitive bundling where entry and exit is not an issue (Matutes and Regibeau 1988, Car-
bajo, De Meza and Seidmann, 1990, Denicolo 2000, Nalebuﬀ, 2000, Armstrong and Vickers
2010, Thanassoulis 2011). The last is about leverage theory of bundling in which the main
motive of bundling is to deter entry or induce the exit of rival firms in the competitive
segment of the market (Whinston, 1990, Choi and Stefanadis 2001, Carlton and Waldman,
2002, Nalebuﬀ, 2004, Peitz 2008, Jeon and Menicucci, 2006, 2012).8
6But the monopolist chooses a price for the bundle which is higher than the minimum valuation for the
bundle, therefore a few consumers buy nothing. This occurs because very few consumers have a valuation
for the bundle which is close to the minimum valuation [see Armstrong (1996)].
7See Choi (2011) for a recent survey of bundling literature.
8Jeon and Menicucci (2006, 2012) study competitive bundling and derive implications on entry barrier.
They consider a common agency setting under complete information in which firms sell portfolios of digital
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We contribute to each of these categories of literature. We contribute to the competitive
bundling theory by building a general framework that includes as a special case the model
of Matutes and Regibeau (1988) and showing that the level of dominance of a firm is a
crucial parameter such that their finding is completely reversed for strong dominance. We
also provide a general intuition in terms of demand size eﬀect and demand elasticity eﬀect.
By studying bundling of a dominant firm and its implications on entry barrier, we bridge
the gap between the real world and the leverage theory which considers only a monopolist
firm. In particular, we show that for intermediate level of dominance, pure bundling builds
barrier to entry and is credible, which is a new finding in the literature. This result provides
a justification for the use of contractual bundling of which the cost of undoing bundling
is low contrary to the technical bundling. Furthermore, when A’s dominance is close to
the monopoly level, we find that building a barrier to entry requires pre-commitment to
independent pricing, which is completely opposite to Whinston’s result. Our results show
that "leverage of monopoly" works quite diﬀerently from "(mutual) leverage of dominance".
We also contribute to the monopoly’s price discrimination theory of bundling, by show-
ing that mixed bundling is dominated by pure bundling when each consumer’s minimum
valuation is large. This complements the main result in McAfee, MacMillan and Whin-
ston (1989), which establishes that a suitable mixed bundling strategy is superior to any
individual pricing strategy.
The paper is organized as follows. We present our model with two products in section
2, compare independent pricing to pure bundling in section 3 and study mixed bundling in
section 4.
2 Model
We consider competition between two generalist firms A and B, each producing two diﬀerent
products, 1 and 2, to address the question of whether bundling or incompatibility helps a
firm to increase its static profit and to foreclose the other firm. With ij we denote product
products and find that in the absence of the buyer’s budget constraint, all equilibria under bundling are
eﬃcient and each firm obtains a profit equal to the social marginal contribution of its portfolio (in this sense
bundling does not build any entry barrier). However, in the presence of the budget constraint, bundling
builds an entry barrier since it allows firms with large portfolios to take all the budget.
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j produced by firm i, for i = A,B and j = 1, 2.
We consider a model of both vertical and horizontal diﬀerentiation. Each consumer has
a unit demand for each product j and we use xj ∈ [0, 1] to denote a generic consumer’s
location in terms of product j. For each product, firm A is located at xA = 0 and firm
B is located at xB = 1. The gross utility that a consumer with location xj obtains from
consuming product ij is given by vij− t|xj−xi|, where vij > 0 is the same for all consumers,
t is the usual transportation cost parameter and |xj − xi| denotes the distance between the
consumer’s and the firm’s location. The gross utility that a consumer with location (x1, x2)
obtains from consuming products i1 and i02 is simply the sum vi1−t|x1−xi|+vi02−t|x2−xi0|.
We assume that x1 and x2 are identically and independently distributed with support
[0, 1], c.d.f F (·) and density f such that f(x) > 0 for all x ∈ (0, 1). Moreover, we assume
that f is diﬀerentiable, symmetric around 1/2, and log(f) is a concave function. This implies
that f(·) is weakly increasing on [0, 1/2] and weakly decreasing on [1/2, 1]. It also implies
that log(F ) is concave.9 Log-concavity of g(·) is equivalent to gg00− (g0)2 ≤ 0, which we will
often use, both for g = F and for g = f .
We assume that vij is suﬃciently high so that every consumer consumes one unit of each
product. Hence, the two products can be interpreted as products that can be independently
consumed or complements. We normalize the marginal cost of production at zero but assume
that the true marginal cost before the normalization is such that each consumer buys only
one unit of each of the two products. Given our assumption of large vij, a crucial role is
played by the diﬀerence between vAj and vBj. In order to isolate the eﬀect of dominance, we
normalize vA1 and vA2 such that vA1 = vA2 = v and let α ≡ v−vB ≥ 0 where vB = vB1 = vB2.
Let pij be the price charged by firm i for product ij under independent pricing. Under
bundling or incompatibility, Pi denotes the price charged by firm i for the bundle of products
i1 and i2. We study three diﬀerent games of simultaneous pricing played by the two firms.
• Game of independent pricing [IP]: firm A chooses pA1 and pA2 and firm B chooses pB1
and pB2.
• Game of pure bundling [PB]: firm A chooses only PA for the bundle of A1 and A2 and
firm B chooses PB for the bundle of B1 and B2.
9See for example Bagnoli and Bergstrom (2005)
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• Game of mixed bundling [MB]: firm A chooses PA, pA1 and pA2 and firm B chooses
PB, pB1 and pB2.
In section 3, we study the first two games and compare them. In section 4, we study
the third game (under the additional simplifying assumption that the consumer’s location
is distributed uniformly). This analysis allows us to study the sequential game with the
following structure. In stage one, firm B chooses between entering or not. In stage two, if B
has entered, each firm chooses between IP and PB. In stage three, firms compete in prices
in the game determined by their choices at stage two. Notice that if in stage two at least one
firm has chosen PB, then competition occurs in stage three between the two pure bundles.10
Therefore competition in independent prices occurs only if both firms have chosen IP .
When we allow for mixed bundling we assume that the stage two choices are IP , PB, or
MB. Again, competition in independent prices occurs only if both firms have chosen IP and
when at least one firm chooses PB, competition will eﬀectively be between pure bundles.
3 Independent pricing and pure bundling
3.1 Preliminaries
If X1 and X2 are two random variables that are i.i.d. with log-concave density function f ,
then the average valuation, (X1 + X2)/2, is distributed with density function f˜ which is
also log-concave. Moreover, the average valuation is more-peaked around the mean than the
original valuation.11 That is, for any t ∈ (0, 1/2)Z 1−t
t
f(s)ds ≤
Z 1−t
t
f˜(s)ds.
The density function of the average valuation is given by
f˜(z) =
Z 2z
0
2f(2z − x)f(x)dx for z ≤ 1/2
10Indeed, suppost that firm A, for instance, has chosen PB and firm B has chosen IP . Then each consumer
either buys the pure bundle of A or the two products of firm B, which are therefore viewed as a bundle.
11Observe that for distribution functions that are not log-concave, the average valuation is not neces-
sarily more-peaked than the original distribution. This explains our restriction to log-concave distribution
functions. An example of such distribution is the Cauchy distribution.
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and
f˜(z) = f˜(1− z) =
Z 2−2z
0
2f(2− 2z − x)f(x)dx for z ≥ 1/2.
The CDF of the average distribution is F˜ (x) =
R x
0
f˜(z)dz.
In the special case where consumers’ valuations are uniformly distributed, we have (for
x ≥ 1/2) f(x) = 1, F (x) = x, f˜(x) = 4(1 − x), and F˜ (x) = 1 − 2(1 − x)2. These function
are depicted in Figure 1.
figure 1 (see at the end of this document)
Two facts about a log-concave distribution f are (i) f˜(1/2) > f(1/2) and (ii) f˜(z) < f(z)
for all z ∈ (0, z¯) for small positive z¯. We will use these facts later.
3.2 Independent Pricing
When firms compete in independent prices, we can consider each market in isolation and can
restrict attention to price competition on the Hotelling line where consumers are distributed
according to F . Recall that firm A (B) is located at 0 (1) and firm A oﬀers a product that
is valued α higher than the product of firm B. Hence, at prices pA and pB the indiﬀerent
consumer is located at
x(α, pA, pB) =
1
2
+ σ(α− pA + pB), (1)
where σ = 1/(2t). For clarity we will often suppress the arguments and simply write x for
the location of the indiﬀerent consumer.
Since the markets for the two products are symmetric, the equilibrium prices in the two
markets will be the same, and we here only need to solve for the equilibrium in one of the
markets. We will assume that distributions and parameters are such that independent pricing
leads to an interior equilibrium (defined by first-order conditions) in which both firms obtain
positive market share. Since marginal costs are assumed to be zero, the profit functions are
πA = pAF (x) and πB = pB(1− F (x)).
The first-order conditions are
0 = F (x)− σpAf(x),
0 = 1− F (x)− σpBf(x).
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Note that dπAdpA can be written as
dπA
dpA
= F (x)[1− σpA
f(1
2
+ σ(α− pA + pB))
F (1
2
+ σ(α− pA + pB))
].
Since F is log concave, it follows that f(
1
2
+σ(α−pA+pB))
F ( 1
2
+σ(α−pA+pB))
is increasing in pA. Therefore, 1 −
σpA
f( 1
2
+σ(α−pA+pB))
F ( 1
2
+σ(α−pA+pB))
is decreasing in pA and this implies that dπAdpA = 0 is necessary and
suﬃcient to maximize πA with respect to pA. A similar argument reveals that dπBdpB = 0 is
necessary and suﬃcient to maximize πB with respect to pB.
From the first-order conditions one can see immediately that the pair of equilibrium prices
(p∗A, p
∗
B) must be a fixed point of the mapping H:
H : (pA, pB) 7→
µ
F (1
2
+ σ(α− pA + pB))
σf(1
2
+ σ(α− pA + pB))
,
1− F (1
2
+ σ(α− pA + pB))
σf(1
2
+ σ(α− pA + pB))
¶
.
If x∗ denotes the equilibrium location of the indiﬀerent consumer, then we have
x∗ =
1
2
+ σα− σ(p∗A − p∗B) =
1
2
+ σα+
1− 2F (x∗)
f(x∗)
.
Hence, the equilibrium location of the indiﬀerent consumer must be a fixed point of the
mapping:
Xα : x 7→ 1
2
+ σα+
1− 2F (x)
f(x)
. (2)
This mapping has a unique fixed point because Xα is a strictly decreasing function:
dXα/dx =
−2f(x)f(x)− (1− 2F (x))f 0(x)
f(x)2
= −2− (1− F (x))f
0(x)
f(x)2
+
F (x)f 0(x)
f(x)2
= −2 + F (1− x)f
0(1− x)
f(1− x)2 +
F (x)f 0(x)
f(x)2
< 0.
The inequality follows from the assumption of log-concavity. Uniqueness of the fixed point
x∗ implies that the equilibrium in prices is also unique. Clearly, at α = 0, the fixed point is
x∗ = 1/2 and for α > 0 the fixed point has x∗ > 1/2.
Proposition 1 (Independent Pricing) The independent pricing game has a unique equi-
librium, characterized by the unique fixed point x∗(α) of Xα. The equilibrium prices are
p∗A(α) =
F (x∗(α))
σf(x∗(α))
,
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p∗B(α) =
1− F (x∗(α))
σf(x∗(α))
.
The equilibrium profits are
π∗A(α) =
F (x∗(α))2
σf(x∗(α))
π∗B(α) =
(1− F (x∗(α)))2
σf(x∗(α))
.
Both equilibrium profit functions are convex in α; π∗A is increasing in α and π
∗
B is decreasing
in α.
3.3 Pure Bundling
The analysis performed above for independent pricing straightforwardly extends to the case
where firms A and B bundle their two products. When bundle prices PA = 2pA and PB = 2pB
are chosen, consumers with average location x < x˜ will buy the bundle from firm A, while
consumers with average location x > x˜ will buy the bundle from firm B. Here
x˜ =
1
2
+ σ (α− pA + pB) .
The equilibrium bundle prices are found in a way very similar to the analysis of inde-
pendent pricing, as in fact this can be considered as a competition between two firms each
oﬀering one product (in fact a bundle). The only diﬀerence is that the underlying density
function of the average value of the bundle (or the value of half of a bundle) would be given
by f˜ rather than by f . Let us define
X˜α : x 7→ 1
2
+ σα+
1− 2F˜ (x)
f˜(x)
. (3)
It follows immediately that this mapping is strictly decreasing, and that equilibrium
prices and profits can be expressed in terms of the unique fixed point of this mapping.
Proposition 2 (Pure Bundling) The pure bundling pricing game has a unique equilib-
rium, characterized by the unique fixed point x∗∗(α) of X˜α. The equilibrium prices are then
P ∗∗A (α) =
2F˜ (x∗∗(α))
σf˜(x∗∗(α))
,
P ∗∗B (α) =
2(1− F (x∗∗(α)))
σf(x∗∗(α))
.
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The equilibrium profits are
Π∗∗A (α) =
2F˜ (x∗∗(α))2
σf˜(x∗∗(α))
Π∗∗B (α) =
2(1− F˜ (x∗∗(α)))2
σf˜(x∗∗(α))
.
Both equilibrium profit functions are convex in α; Π∗∗A is increasing in α and Π∗∗B is decreasing
in α.
3.4 Illustration: Uniformly distributed valuations
For the special case of uniformly distributed valuations we can get explicit expressions for
equilibrium prices and profits.
Proposition 3 In the case of uniformly distributed valuations and t = 1, α ≤ 3 (to guar-
antee that firm B has a positive market share under independent pricing) we have
independent pricing x∗ = (3 + α)/6, p∗A = 2x
∗, p∗B = 2(1 − x∗), π∗A = 2(x∗)2, π∗B =
2(1− x∗)2.
pure bundling x∗∗ =
¡
7 + α−
√
9− 2α+ α2
¢
/8, P ∗∗A = (1−2(1−x∗∗)2)/(1−x∗∗), P ∗∗B =
2(1− x∗∗), Π∗A = (1− 2(1− x∗∗)2)2/(1− x∗∗), Π∗∗B = 4(1− x∗∗)3.
Figure 2 illustrates how equilibrium market shares, prices, and profits for firm A (left
panel) and firm B (right panel) are aﬀected by bundling for diﬀerent values of the advantage
of firm A. The inequality Π∗A > 2π∗A holds if and only if α > 1.415. The inequality Π∗B > 2π∗B
holds if and only if α > 2.376.
figure 2 (see at the end of this document)
3.5 Comparing independent pricing and pure bundling
Let us first consider the case where firm A has no advantage over firm B, that is, consider
α = 0. In this case both firms obtain half of the market as the indiﬀerent consumer is
located at x∗ = x∗∗ = 1/2, both with independent pricing and with bundling. However, the
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equilibrium bundle prices are strictly lower than the sum of the equilibrium prices under
independent pricing. This so because f(1/2) < f˜(1/2) and F (1/2) = F˜ (1/2) so that
2p∗A =
2F (1/2)
σf(1/2)
>
2F˜ (1/2)
σf˜(1/2)
= P ∗∗A .
Bundling thus hurts both firms.
Now consider the extreme case where firm A has such a huge advantage that it basically
becomes a monopolist, despite the competition of firm B. That is, α is so high that x∗ ≈ 1.
With independent pricing firm B then sets optimally a price of almost 0 in each market and
still gets almost no market share. In this case, bundling will increase the market share of
firm B. This follows directly from the fact that f˜(1) = 0, so that x∗∗ < 1 (see Eq. 3). Hence,
in this case bundling increases both the price and the market share of firm B, and thus also
the profits of firm B. Since firm B sets a strictly positive bundle price, firm A could obtain
the whole market by setting a bundle price equal to 2p∗A. However, since the equilibrium
market share for firm A is strictly below 1, it is apparently better for firm A to increase the
price and concede some of his market share. So in this extreme case both firms gain from
bundling.
We now analyze the case for intermediate levels of α. To that end we first define αMS > 0
as the level of dominance for which F (x∗(αMS)) = F˜ (x∗∗(αMS)). That is, αMS is the
(positive) level of dominance for which equilibrium market share of each firm is the same
under independent pricing and under bundling.
To see that such a level exists, note that for extreme high values of α, F (x∗(α)) ≈ 1 >
F˜ (x∗∗(α)) while F (x∗(0)) = F˜ (x∗∗(0)). Moreover,
d
dα
F (x∗(α)) = f(x∗(α))(x∗)0(α),
while
d
dα
F˜ (x∗∗(α)) = f˜(x∗∗(α))(x∗∗)0(α).
Evaluating these expressions at α = 0 yields f(1/2)σ/3 and f˜(1/2)σ/3, respectively. The
latter expression is strictly higher than the former so that we conclude that F˜ (x∗∗(α)) >
F (x∗(α)) for small but positive values of α. Assuming that αMS is uniquely defined, we have
that F˜ (x∗∗(α)) < F (x∗(α)) if and only if α > αMS.
Next we define αDENS > 0 as the level of dominance where f(x∗(αDENS)) = f˜(x∗∗(αDENS)).
Such a level exists since f(x∗(0)) = f(1/2) < f˜(1/2) = f˜(x∗∗(0)). Assuming again that the
level is uniquely defined, we have that f(x∗(α)) > f˜(x∗∗(α)) if and only if α > αDENS.
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We now establish the following result.
Lemma 1 αDENS < αMS.
Proof. Note that for all α
x∗∗(α)− x∗(α) = 1− 2F˜ (x
∗∗(α))
f˜(x∗∗(α))
− 1− 2F (x
∗(α))
f(x∗(α))
.
This follows from the definition ofX and X˜ in Eqs. (2) and (3). In particular, for α = αDENS
it follows that
f(x∗)(x∗∗ − x∗) = 2(F (x∗∗)− F˜ (x∗)).
Suppose that αDENS ≥ αMS. Then x∗∗ ≥ x∗. But then F˜ (x∗∗) ≥ F˜ (x∗) > F (x∗) where
the inequality follows from the fact that the average distribution is more-peaked around the
mean and that x∗ > 1/2. But this in turn implies that x∗∗ < x∗, which contradicts our
earlier conclusion. Hence the lemma follows.
We need to define some more specific levels of dominance.
Definition 1 Let αPA, απA, αPB and απB be uniquely defined as follows:
(i)
P ∗∗A (x
∗∗(α)) > 2p∗A(x
∗(α)) for α > αPA
(ii)
Π∗∗A (x
∗∗(α)) > 2π∗A(x
∗(α)) for α > απA
(iii)
P ∗∗B (x
∗∗(α)) > 2p∗B(x
∗(α)) for α > αPB
(iv)
Π∗∗B (x
∗∗(α)) > 2π∗B(x
∗(α)) for α > απB
Dominance level αPA (αPA) denotes the level where the equilibrium bundle price of firm
A (B) equals the sum of the equilibrium prices under independent pricing of firm A (B).
Similarly, dominance level απA (απB) denotes the level where firm A (B) obtains the same
total equilibrium profit under bundling and independent pricing. We obtain the following
ordering of these levels.
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Lemma 2 απA < αPA < αDENS < αPB < απB < αMS.
Proof. Let us first focus on firm A. Note that since αDENS < αMS, F˜ (x∗∗(αDENS)) >
F (x∗(αDENS)) while f˜(x∗∗(αDENS)) = f(x∗(αDENS)). Hence, at level αDENS firm A sets
higher total price and makes higher profits under bundling than under independent pricing.
It follows that αMS > αDENS > αPA and αDENS > απA.
We can now also conclude that at level αPA firm A obtains higher market share under
bundling than under independent pricing, while the total price is equal in both settings.
Hence, firm A obtains a higher profit under bundling than under independent pricing, at the
level αPA. This implies that αPA > απA.
Let us now focus on firm B. The arguments are similar but slightly more involved. Note
that since αDENS < αMS, 1− F˜ (x∗∗(αDENS)) < 1− F (x∗(αDENS)) while f˜(x∗∗(αDENS)) =
f(x∗(αDENS)). Hence, at level αDENS firm B sets lower total price and makes lower profits
under bundling than under independent pricing. It follows that αDENS < αPB and αDENS <
απB.
Note that f˜(x∗∗(αMS)) < f(x∗(αMS)). Hence, at level αMS firm B sets higher price
and makes more profit under bundling than under independent pricing. This means that
αPB < αMS and απB < αMS.
Finally, since αPB < αMS, we have that 1− F˜ (x∗∗(αPB)) < 1− F (x∗(αPB)). Hence, at
level αPB firm B obtains less market share and thus total profit under bundling than under
independent pricing. Hence, αPB < απB.
An immediate consequence of the previous lemma is that there are three regions of
dominance levels determined by cutoﬀ levels αA < αB such that bundling hurts both firms
when α < αA, helps both firms when α > αB, and only helps the dominant firm when
α ∈ (αA, αB). We record this result in the following proposition.
Proposition 4 There exist levels of dominance απB > απA > 0 such that
(i) profits of firm A are strictly higher under bundling if and only if α > απA and
(ii) profits of firm B are strictly higher under bundling if and only if α > απB.
Therefore, for low levels of dominance firm B may decide not to enter if it anticipates that
A chooses bundling, but in fact such a fear is unjustified since once B is active, firm A prefers
independent pricing. (If we consider a case in which A can precommit to bundling, then
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this instrument could provoke the non-entry of firm B, but it would be non-credible.) For
higher levels of dominance, conversely, firm A chooses bundling even though B enters, thus
B should anticipate this and compare the cost of entry with the own profit under bundling.
However, if dominance is very strong then bundling actually increases the profit of firm B,
and thus does not act as a foreclosure strategy in this circumstance. Rather, firm A would
more likely deter entry if he could impose competition under independent pricing, but firm
B can prevent this by choosing PB at stage two.
Another corollary of the proposition is that if bundling by the dominant firm reduces its
overall market share, both firms will profit from the bundling strategy. However, it leads to
higher prices and moreover less consumers will buy the higher quality product. This suggests
that consumer surplus is reduced in such case.
3.6 Intuition
The results derived say that the eﬀect of bundling on prices and profits depends crucially
on the advantage that firm A has over firm B. One can understand these eﬀects once one
realizes that there are two basic eﬀects of bundling products: the demand size eﬀect and the
demand elasticity eﬀect. We will explain these eﬀects in the following.
DEMAND SIZE EFFECT Suppose that firms A and B sell the two products inde-
pendently and set prices (for each of their two products) pA and pB. Suppose furthermore
that at these prices firm A sells more units than firm B. That is, firm A has market share
larger than one half and thus the indiﬀerent consumer in each market is located at x∗ > 1/2.
Then the total demand for firm A equals 2F (x∗).
Now assume that firm A and B bundle their two products at a price equal to the sum of
the prices they set before. That is, PA = 2pA and PB = 2pB. Then the indiﬀerent consumer is
the consumer who has average valuation x∗. Since the distribution of the average valuation
is more-peaked around the mean than the distribution of the single valuation, we have
F˜ (x∗) > F (x∗). Hence, the demand after bundling, without changing prices, increases for
firm A and decreases for firm B, unless firm A covers the whole market to start with.
DEMAND ELASTICITY EFFECT
However, after bundling firms will have incentives to change their prices. In particular,
in equilibrium the elasticity of demand must be equal to one. Note that the elasticity of
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demand for firm A at the independent pricing equilibrium equals
εA = −
D0(p)p
D(p)
=
σf(x∗)p∗A
F (x∗)
= 1.
Now when firm A and B bundle their products without changing prices, elasticity equals
ε˜A =
σf˜(x∗)p∗A
F˜ (x∗)
=
f˜(x∗)F (x∗)
f(x∗)F˜ (x∗)
.
For relatively low levels of dominance (that is, x∗ not too far from 1/2) this elasticity is strictly
larger than 1, because F (1/2) = F˜ (1/2) and f˜(1/2) > f(1/2). This implies that firm A has
strong incentives to lower its price. On the other hand, if firm A has large dominance, the
elasticity is smaller than 1 and thus firm A will want to increase its price (per product).
The same argument holds for firm B. However, the level of dominance for which firm A will
set the same total price under bundling and independent pricing is diﬀerent from the one
where firm B would do so. In fact, the level of dominance for which firm A does not change
his total price was defined before as αPA. We saw that necessarily αPA < αDENS < αMS.
Hence, at the level αPA, f˜(x∗∗) > f(x∗). Since at the level αPA
2F˜ (x∗∗)
σf˜(x∗∗)
= P ∗∗A = 2p
∗
A =
2F (x∗)
σf(x∗)
,
we have that at the same level of dominance
P ∗∗B =
2(1− F˜ (x∗∗))
σf˜(x∗∗)
<
2F (x∗)
σf(x∗)
= 2p∗B.
That is, at the level where firm A’s total equilibrium price is the same under independent
pricing and bundling, firm B still sets a lower price under bundling. At this level, firm A
obtains higher profit under bundling while firm B obtains lower profit under bundling.
4 Mixed Bundling
In this section we consider the case in which the firms can practice mixed bundling, that is
firm i chooses a price Pi for the bundle of the own products, and a price pi for each single
product, for i = A,B. Thus each consumer can buy the bundle of a firm i and pay Pi, or
one object from each firm for a total outlay pA+pB. When α is suﬃciently large we find the
same equilibrium outcome described by Proposition 2 for the case of ”pure bundling vs pure
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bundling”, essentially because for firm A a pure bundling strategy (i.e., a pricing strategy
with a high pA which ”forces” each type of consumer to choose one of the two bundles) is
superior to any alternative strategy when he has a large advantage over firm B.
First we notice that if Pi > 2pi, then no type of consumer buys i’s bundle, as buying i’s
two separate products is less expensive. However, the profit of i is unchanged if he lowers Pi
to satisfy Pi = 2pi: if now a consumer wants to buy the two products of i, then he pays to
i the same amount of money regardless of whether he buys the products separately or as a
bundle (and the same amount of money as when Pi > 2pi). Thus, without loss of generality
we assume that Pi ≤ 2pi for i = A,B, and that each consumer willing to buy both products
of i buys i’s bundle.
As a consequence, each consumer chooses among the following four alternatives: AA
(which means buying A’s bundle), AB (which means buying products A1 and B2), BA
(which means buying productsB1 andA2), BB (which means buyingB’s bundle). Precisely,
for a consumer with type (x1, x2) the payoﬀ fromAA is 2v−t(x1+x2)−Pi; the payoﬀ fromAB
is 2v−α− tx1− t(1−x2)−pA−pB; the payoﬀ from BA is 2v−α− t(1−x1)− tx2−pB−pA;
the payoﬀ from BB is 2v − 2α − t(1 − x1) − t(1 − x2) − PB. In order to describe the
preferred alternative of each type of consumer we introduce x0 ≡ 1
2
+ α+PB−pA−pB
2t and x
00 ≡
1
2
+ α+pA+pB−PA
2t , with x
0 ≤ x00 since PA ≤ 2pA, PB ≤ 2pB, and obtain that
• Type (x1, x2) buys AA if and only if x1 ≤ x00, x2 ≤ x00, x1 + x2 ≤ x0 + x00.12 Let SAA
and μAA denote, respectively, the set of types which satisfy these inequalities and the
measure of SAA.
• Type (x1, x2) buys AB if and only if x2 > x00, x1 ≤ x0 (another inequality x2 ≥ x1 is
implied by the former two). Let SAB and μAB denote, respectively, the set of types
which satisfy these inequalities and the measure of SAB.
• Type (x1, x2) buys BA if and only if x1 > x00, x2 ≤ x0 (the inequality x1 ≥ x2 is implied
by the former two). Let SBA denote the set of types which satisfy these inequalities.
Notice that the measure of SBA is equal to μAB.
• Type (x1, x2) buys BB if and only if x1 > x0, x2 > x0, x1 + x2 > x0 + x00. Let SBB
12Since the distribution of consumer types is atomless, how indiﬀerences are broken does not aﬀect the
results.
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and μBB denote, respectively, the set of types which satisfy these inequalities and the
measure of SBB.
If 0 < x0 and x00 < 1 (i.e., if pA + pB − PB < t+ α and α− t < PA − pA − pB), then each
of the sets SAA, SAB, SBB has a positive measure, and precisely
μAA = F (x
0)F (x00) +
Z x00
x0
F (x0 + x00 − x1)f(x1)dx1; μAB = F (x0)[1− F (x00)]; (4)
μBB = [1− F (x0)][1− F (x00)]2 +
Z x00
x0
[1− F (x0 + x00 − x1)]f(x1)dx1
If instead x0 ≤ 0 and/or x00 ≥ 1, then μAB = 0 and SAA = {(x1, x2) ∈ [0, 1]2 : x1 + x2 ≤
x0 + x00}, SBB = {(x1, x2) ∈ [0, 1]2 : x1 + x2 > x0 + x00} as in Section 3.3.13
In either case the firms’ profits are given by
πA = PAμAA + 2pAμAB; πB = PBμBB + 2pBμAB
Given a NE (p∗A, P ∗A, p∗B, P ∗B), with ensuing measures μ∗AA, μ∗AB, μ∗BB for SAA, SAB, SBB, we
say that (p∗A, P ∗A, p∗B, P ∗B) is a mixed bundling NE if μ∗AB > 0. If instead μ∗AB = 0 holds,
then we say that (p∗A, P ∗A, p∗B, P ∗B) is a pure bundling NE. It is almost immediate to see that a
pure bundling NE exists for any values of parameters,14 and our main result in this section
establishes that no mixed bundling NE exists when α is suﬃciently large, that is when the
dominance of firm A is suﬃciently strong.
In order to establish this result, we first prove a result in the theory of monopoly bundling.
Precisely, we consider a two-good monopolist facing a single consumer with valuations (v1, v2)
which are independently distributed over a set [ω+ a1, ω+ b1]× [ω+ a2, ω+ b2], with ω > 0
and ai ≥ 0, bi > ai for i = 1, 2, such that the joint density of (v1, v2) is strictly positive in
[ω + a1, ω + b1] × [ω + a2, ω + b2]. We prove in Proposition 5 below that if ω is suﬃciently
large, then the monopolist does not want to sell object 1 alone, or object 2 alone, to any
type of consumer, but rather uses a pure bundling strategy — a strategy inducing each type
to either buy the bundle, or no product.
13Precisely, if x0 < 0 then each type of consumer prefers BB to AB and to BA. If x00 > 1, then each type
of consumer prefers AA to AB and to BA.
14Let PˆA, PˆB denote the equilibrium prices from Proposition 2. When mixed bundling is allowed,
(pˆA, PˆA, pˆB, PˆB) is a NE if pˆA and pˆB are large, as for firm A (B) it is impossible to induce any type of
consumer to choose AB or BA since PB = PˆB and a large pB imply x0 < 0 for any pA ≥ 0 and thus
SAB = SBA = ∅ (PA = PˆA and a large pA imply x0 > 1 for any pB ≥ 0 and thus SAB = SBA = ∅).
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This results is relevant for our duopoly setting because given pB, PB chosen by firm B,
for firm A the problem of maximizing πA is equivalent to the problem of maximizing the
profit of a two-good monopolist facing a single consumer with valuations (v1, v2) suitably
distributed. Given pB, PB, we define b1 ≡ PB − pB +α, b2 ≡ pB +α, and notice that b1 ≤ b2
since PB ≤ 2pB. Then suppose that v1, v2 are i.i.d., each with support [b1 − t, b1 + t] and
c.d.f. H(x) = F (x−b1+t
2t ) for x ∈ [b1 − t, b1 + t]; moreover, the consumer enjoys a synergy
s = b2 − b1 ≥ 0 if he consumes both objects. We assume that the monopolist oﬀers the
bundle of his products at a price P and each single object at a price p with P ≤ 2p. Lemma
3 below proves that, in the duopoly setting, the problem of finding pA, PA which maximize
πA is equivalent to the problem of finding the profit maximizing p, P for the monopolist.
However, since we know that pure bundling is the optimal pricing strategy for the monopolist
when ω is large, it follows that pure bundling is the optimal pricing strategy for firm A in
the duopoly setting when α is large, as in increase in α generates an increase in b1.
4.1 Pure bundling as the optimal pricing strategy for a monopolist
A firm is monopolist for two products which are costless to produce,15 and is hereafter
denoted with M. Each consumer wants to consume at most one unit of each object, and
is characterized by his valuations v1, v2 for the two products. His payoﬀ is given by his
gross utility minus his payment to M, and his gross utility is v1 + v2 if he consumes both
products, is vi if he consumes only object i (for i = 1, 2), is zero if he consumes nothing. The
valuations v1, v2 are independently distributed among consumers with supports [ω+a1, ω+b1],
[ω + a2, ω + b2] respectively, such that ω ≥ 0, a1 ≥ 0, a2 ≥ 0, and b1 > a1, b2 > a2. For
i = 1, 2, the c.d.f. for vi is denoted with Gi and is such that Gi(k) = G¯i(k − ω) for each
k ∈ R, in which G¯i is the c.d.f. of a random variable with support [ai, bi]. Hence, an increase
in ω has the eﬀect of shifting horizontally (rightward) the distributions of v1 and v2, without
modifying the shape of the c.d.f.s. We assume that G¯i has a density g¯i which is continuous
and strictly positive in [ai, bi]. We let γi = minvi∈[ai,bi] g¯i(vi) > 0 and γ = min{γ1, γ2} > 0;
thus gi(vi) = G0i(vi) ≥ γ for each vi ∈ [ω + ai, ω + bi], for i = 1, 2.
A pricing strategy for M consists of p1 ≥ 0, p2 ≥ 0, the prices of the objects sold separately,
and the price p ≥ 0 of the bundle. Given p1, p2, p, each consumer chooses his purchases. As
15We can allow for positive but constant marginal costs. Here they are normalized to zero without loss of
generality.
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we mentioned above, we can without loss of generality restrict to the case in which p ≤ p1+p2.
We denote with S1, S2, S12 the sets of types of consumers which, respectively, buy only
object 1, buy only object 2, buy the bundle; μ1, μ2, μ12 denote the measures of S1, S2, S12,
respectively. Therefore
π = μ1p1 + μ2p2 + μ12p
Clearly, S1, S2, S12 are determined by p1, p2, p and, in particular, a type (v1, v2) of con-
sumer belongs to S1 if and only if16 v1 ≥ p1 (buying only object 1 is better than buying
nothing) and v2 < p− p1 (buying only object 1 is better than buying the bundle).17 There-
fore μ1 = G2(p − p1)[1 − G1(p1)]. Notice that if p1 > ω + b1 and/or p1 > p − ω − a2, then
S1 = ∅ and μ1 = 0 since for each type, v1 < p1 and/or v2 > p− p1. However, π is unchanged
if M lowers p1 to satisfy p1 = min{ω + b1, p− ω − a2}, since then S1 may be non-empty but
still μ1 = 0.18 Therefore, without loss of generality, we assume that M chooses p1 such that
p1 ≤ min{ω + b1, p− ω − a2}.
Likewise, (v1, v2) ∈ S2 if and only if v2 ≥ p2 and v1 < p − p2. Therefore μ2 = G1(p −
p2)[1−G2(p2)]. Arguing as above, we assume without loss of generality that M chooses p2
such that p2 ≤ min{ω + b2, p− ω − a1}.
Finally, (v1, v2) ∈ S12 if and only if v1 + v2 − p ≥ max{0, v1 − p1, v2 − p2}, which is
equivalent to v1 + v2 ≥ p, v1 ≥ p − p2, v2 ≥ p − p1. Therefore μ12 = [1 − G1(p − p2)][1 −
G2(p− p1)]−
R p1
p−p2
R p−v1
p−p1 g2(v2)g1(v1)dv2dv1.
We say that p1, p2, p is a pure bundling strategy if it is such that μ1 = μ2 = 0, which
means that each type either buys the bundle or buys no product. Thus, for instance, p1, p2, p
is a pure bundling strategy if p = min{p1 + ω+ a2, p2 + ω+ a1}. On the other hand, we say
that p1, p2, p is a mixed bundling strategy if it is such that μ1 > 0 and/or μ2 > 0.
Our main result in this subsection establishes that for a large ω, the optimal strategy for
M is a pure bundling strategy.
16As a tie-breaking rule we assume that each consumer which is indiﬀerent between two or more alternatives
chooses the alternative which maximizes his gross utility. However, since the distribution of types is atomless,
how indiﬀerences are broken does not aﬀect the results.
17These two inequalities, jointly with p ≤ p1 + p2, imply v1 − p1 > v2 − p2, that is buying only object 1 is
better than buying only object 2.
18This reduction of p1 does not aﬀect μ2 nor μ12 since, for p1 ≥ min{ω + b1, p − ω − a2}, for no type of
consumer p1 aﬀects the type’s preferred alternative among buying only object 2, buying the bundle, and
buying nothing.
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Proposition 5 If ω is suﬃciently large, then for M any mixed bundling strategy is inferior
to a pure bundling strategy such that p = min{p1 + ω + a2, p2 + ω + a1}.
McAfee, MacMillan and Whinston (1989) prove that a suitable mixed bundling strategy
is superior to any individual pricing strategy. Proposition 5 is a complement to this result,
as it shows that for a large ω, a pure bundling strategy is superior to any mixed bundling
strategy.
The intuition for this result is especially simple when v1, v2 are identically distributed,
that is a1 = a2, b1 = b2 and the two c.d.f. G¯1 and G¯2 are equal. In this case we suppose
without loss of generality that p1 = p2 and notice that a mixed bundling strategy needs to
satisfy p > p1+ω+a1. Then decreasing the price of the bundle to p−ε (with ε > 0 and small)
has the following eﬀects: (i) it induces a few types to buy the bundle rather than only object
1 or object 2, and this increases M’s profit from each of these types by p− p1 − ε > ω + a1;
(ii) it induces a few types to buy the bundle, rather than nothing, and this increases M’s
profit from each of these types by p− ε > ω + a1; (iii) it reduces by ε the profit of M from
each type which was buying the bundle before the reduction. However, since the densities
for v1 and v2 are strictly positive everywhere in [ω+ a1, ω+ b1]× [ω+ a1, ω+ b1], for a large
ω the eﬀects (i)-(ii) dominate eﬀect (iii), and this makes the reduction in the price of the
bundle profitable.
4.2 Duopoly and the mixed bundling NE
The next lemma allows us to use in the duopoly setting the result of Proposition 5.
Given pB, PB chosen by firm B, let b1 ≡ PB − pB + α, b2 ≡ pB + α, with b1 ≤ b2
since PB ≤ 2pB. In the monopoly setting, suppose that v1, v2 are i.i.d., each with support
[b1 − t, b1 + t], and c.d.f. H(x) = F (x−b1+t2t ) for x ∈ [b1 − t, b1 + t]; moreover, the consumer
enjoys a synergy s = b2 − b1 ≥ 0 if he consumes both objects.
Lemma 3 The monopolist’s profit in the above described setting given p, p1 is equal to the
profit for firm A in the duopoly setting if PA = p and pA = p1.
The proof for this result is straightforward, and relies on showing that μ12 and μ1 (μ2 is
equal to μ1 given identical distributions) are equal to μAA and to μAB in (4), respectively, if
PA = p and pA = p1.
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Proposition 6 (i) Suppose that f(0) > 0. Then there exists α∗ < t + 2tf(0) such that there
exists no mixed bundling NE if α > α∗.
(ii) Suppose that the location x = (x1, x2) is uniformly distributed and α ≥ t. Then there
exists no mixed bundling NE.
In order to understand better this result it is useful to consider the point of view of firm
A and notice that pB, PB, α aﬀect πA only through μAA, μAB, and in turn through x0, x00.
Given b1 ≡ PB − pB + α, b2 ≡ pB + α, we say that firm A plays a pure bundling strategy if
pA ≥ b1+ t and/or PA ≤ b2− t+ pA becauseμAB = 0 in either of these cases.19 Given b1, b2,
we define MA as the set of (pA, PA) such that μAB > 0, that is
MA = {(pA, PA) : PA ≤ 2pA, pA < b1 + t, PA > b2 − t+ pA}
We say that A plays a mixed bundling strategy if (pA, PA) ∈ MA. Notice that MA is non-
empty if and only if b1 > −t and b2 < 2t+ b1.
figure 3 (see at the end of this document)
Likewise, for firm B we define a1 ≡ PA − pA − α, a2 ≡ pA − α, such that a1 ≤ a2 since
PA ≤ 2pA, and the set MB (analogous to MA) of (pB, PB) such that μAB > 0:
MB = {(pB, PB) : PB ≤ 2pB, pB < a1 + t, PB > a2 − t+ pB}
One way to express Proposition 6(i) is that if α is suﬃciently large, then there is no NE
(p∗A, P ∗A, p∗B, P ∗B) such that (p∗A, P ∗A) ∈ MA and (p∗B, P ∗B) ∈ MB. This result holds because
if b1, b2 are such that MA 6= ∅, then b2 ≥ t + 2tf(0) is a more than suﬃcient condition to
imply that the best reply of firm A is a pure bundling strategy. Since b2 > α, Proposition
6(i) follows. We remark also that the techniques used in the proof show that it is plausible
that α∗ is significantly smaller than t + 2tf(0) ,
20 and indeed this is the case for the uniform
distribution.
In the particular case of the uniform distribution, t + 2tf(0) = 3t but Proposition 6(ii)
exploits some features of this distribution to prove that no mixed bundling NE exists if
α ≥ t. Precisely, there are two distinct arguments which lead to this result. The first one
19If pA ≥ b1 + t, then x0 ≤ 0; if PA ≤ b2 − t+ pA, then x00 ≥ 1.
20It is interesting to notice that when f(0) > 0, firm A is a monopolist in each of the two markets under
independent pricing if and only if α ≥ t+ 2tf(0) .
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applies when α ≥ 1.125t and establishes that if b1, b2 are such that MA 6= ∅ and b1 ≥ t,
b2 ≥ 1.125t, then a pure bundling strategy of firm A strictly dominates any mixed bundling
strategy. Since b1 > α, b2 > α, it follows that α ≥ 1.125t implies that no mixed bundling
NE exists.21 The second argument applies when t ≤ α < 1.125t. In this case the inequality
b2 < 1.125t is satisfied provided that pB is small, but we prove that no optimal mixed
bundling strategy of A induces B to play a small pB.
Proposition 6 implies that in the three-stage game of entry with choice of competition
regime, we have the same result described at the end of subsection 3.5.22
5 Conclusion
By studying bundling of a dominant firm, we provide new insights about when bundling
intensifies (or softens) competition and when bundling reduces the dominated firm’s profit.
In particular, we find that for an intermediate level of dominance, pure bundling is profitable,
credible and builds an entry barrier. This novel finding provides a justification for the use
of contractual bundling of which the cost of undoing bundling is low contrary to technical
bundling. For instance, Whinston (1990) explains technical tying as a commitment device
to (pure) bundling but his theory cannot explain the use of contractual bundling, which is
also often used.
It would be interesting to extend the model to various directions such as allowing for
asymmetric dominance, more than two products, correlation of valuations, competition
against specialized firms. For instance, the extension to a large number of products is useful
to analyze competition between smart phones which integrate more and more features.
21Indeed, we can prove that P ∗B > p
∗
B in any mixed bundling NE, and thus b1 > α. The proof is omitted
for the sake of brevity.
22In fact, this requires to consider also the cases in which firm A chooses IP and B chooses MB, and
the opposite case in which A chooses MB and B chooses IP . In the first case we find that the profit of B
is smaller than under competition between pure bundles. In the second case we find the same outcome as
under competition between pure bundles.
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6 Appendix: Proofs for the results in Section 4
6.1 Proof of Proposition 5
We prove that, for a large ω, given any mixed bundling strategy, for M it is profitable to
reduce p in order to satisfy p = min{p1 + ω + a2, p2 + ω + a1}, which implies that M plays
pure bundling strategy. In order to fix the ideas, we consider p1, p2 such that p2 + ω + a1 ≤
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p1+ω+a2. Hence, if (p1, p2, p) is a mixed bundling strategy then p2+ω+a1 < p. Step 1 proves
that ∂π∂p ≤ 0 if p1 + ω+ a2 < p; Step 2 proves that
∂π
∂p ≤ 0 if p2 + ω+ a1 < p = p1 + ω+ a2.23
Step 1 If ω > 1γ and (p1, p2, p) is a mixed bundling strategy such that p1 + ω + a2 < p,
then ∂π∂p ≤ 0.
First notice that if p > p2+ω+ b1, then μ1 = μ12 = 0, μ2 = 1−G2(p2) and ∂π∂p = 0; likewise,
if p > p1+ω+b2 then ∂π∂p = 0. In the following we prove that
∂π
∂p < 0 for p between p1+ω+a2
and min{p1 + ω + b2, p2 + ω + b1.
From π = μ1p1 + μ2p2 + μ12p we obtain
∂π
∂p ,
∂μ1
∂p p1 +
∂μ2
∂p p2 +
∂μ12
∂p p+ μ12. Since
∂μ1
∂p
, [1−G1(p1)]g2(p− p1),
∂μ2
∂p
, [1−G2(p2)]g1(p− p1)
∂μ12
∂p
, −[1−G1(p1)]g2(p− p1)− [1−G2(p2)]g1(p− p1)−
Z p1
p−p2
g2(p− v1)g1(v1)dv1
after rearranging we obtain
∂π
∂p
, −(p−p1)[1−G1(p1)]g2(p−p1)−(p−p2)[1−G2(p2)]g1(p−p2)+μ12−p
Z p1
p−p2
g2(p−v1)g1(v1)dv1
Since μ12 < [1− G2(p − p1)][1 − G1(p − p2)] and gi(vi) ≥ γ for any vi ∈ [ω + ai, ω + bi] for
i = 1, 2, it follows that
∂π
∂p
≤ −(p− p2)[1−G2(p2)]g1(p− p2)− (p− p1)[1−G1(p1)]γ + [1−G1(p− p2)][1−G2(p− p1)]
−pγ[G1(p1)−G1(p− p2)]
< −(p− p2)[1−G2(p2)]g1(p− p2) + [1−G1(p− p2)][1−G2(p− p1)]− (p− p1)γ[1−G1(p− p2)]
= −(p− p2)[1−G2(p2)]g1(p− p2) + [1−G1(p− p2)][1−G2(p− p1)− (p− p1)γ] (5)
Given ω > 1γ , it follows that 1 − G2(p − p1) − (p − p1)γ < 0 since p − p1 ≥ ω + a2. This
implies that (5) is negative since p− p2 < ω + b1.
Step 2 If ω is large and (p1, p2, p) is a mixed bundling strategy such that p2 + ω + a1 <
p = p1 + ω + a2, then ∂π∂p ≤ 0.
Given p = p1 + ω + a2, it follows that μ1 = 0 and therefore π = p2μ2 + pμ12. Furthermore,
if p > p2 + ω + b1 then μ2 = 1−G2(p2) and μ12 = 0, thus ∂π∂p = 0. In the following we prove
that ∂π∂p < 0 for p between p2 + ω + a1 and p2 + ω + b1, therefore π is maximized by setting
p = p2 + ω + a1.
23In fact, even though ∂π∂p = 0 in some cases, our proof establishes that it is profitable for M to choose p
equal to p2 + α+ a1. A similar remark applies when p2 + α+ a1 < p = p1 + α+ a2.
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From p ≤ p2 + ω + b1 we obtain μ2 , G1(p − p2)[1 − G2(p2)] and μ12 , 1 − G1(p − p2) −R p−ω−a2
p−p2 G2(p− v1)g1(v1)dv1, therefore
∂π
∂p
, p2g1(p− p2)[1−G2(p2)] + 1−G1(p− p2)−
Z p−ω−a2
p−p2
G2(p− v1)g1(v1)dv1
+p{−g1(p− p2) +G2(p2)g1(p− p2)−
Z p−ω−a2
p−p2
g2(p− v1)g1(v1)dv1}
, 1−G1(p− p2)− (p− p2)g1(p− p2)[1−G2(p2)]−
Z p−ω−a2
p−p2
[G2(p− v1) + pg2(p− v1)]g1(v1)dv1
≤ 1−G1(p− p2)− (p− p2)γ[1−G2(p2)]− pγ[G1(p− ω − a2)−G1(p− p2)]
< 1−G1(p− p2)− ωγ[1−G2(p2) +G1(p− ω − a2)−G1(p− p2)] (6)
In order to prove that (6) is negative for a large ω, we distinguish the following three cases
(the first two are closely related):
(i) p2 + ω + a1 < p ≤ 2ω + b1 + a2 and a1 + b2 > b1 + a2;
(ii) p2 + ω + a1 < p ≤ 2ω + b1 + a2 and a1 + b2 ≤ b1 + a2;
(iii) 2ω + b1 + a2 < p ≤ p2 + ω + b1.
In case (i), p2+ω+a1 < p ≤ 2ω+b1+a2 implies p2 < ω+b1−a1+a2, and ω+b1−a1+a2 < ω+b2
holds since a1 + b2 > b1 + a2. Then we define the compact set
P 0 = {(p2, p) : p2 ∈ [ω + a2, ω + b1 − a1 + a2] and p ∈ [p2 + ω + a1, 2ω + b1 + a2]}
and the continuous function Z(p2, p) ≡ 1 − G2(p2) + G1(p − ω − a2) − G1(p − p2) ≥ 0 for
(p2, p) ∈ P 0.24 Therefore there exists a number ζ 0 ≥ 0 such that Z(p2, p) ≥ ζ 0 for each
(p2, p) ∈ P 0, but in fact ζ 0 > 0 since p2 < ω+ b2 at any point in P 0 and thus 1−G2(p2) > 0.
Hence (6) is negative for any (p2, p) ∈ P 0 as long as ω > 1γζ0 .
In case (ii), p2 + ω + a1 < p ≤ 2ω + b1 + a2 is consistent with any p2 ∈ [ω + a2, ω + b2] and
then we define the compact set
P 00 = {(p2, p) : p2 ∈ [ω + a2, ω + b2] and p ∈ [p2 + ω + a1, 2ω + b1 + a2]}
and the continuous function Z(p2, p) ≡ 1 − G2(p2) + G1(p − ω − a2) − G1(p − p2) ≥ 0
for (p2, p) ∈ P 00. Therefore there exists a number ζ 00 ≥ 0 such that Z(p2, p) ≥ ζ 00 for
each (p2, p) ∈ P 00, but in fact ζ 00 > 0 since Z(p2, p) = 0 in P 00 requires p2 = ω + b2, but
24In P 0 we allow for p = p2+α+a1 in order for P 0 to be a closed set, even though this equality is violated
in any mixed bundling strategy given μ1 = 0 (a similar remark applies the set P 00 defined below).
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G1(p− ω− a2)−G1(p− ω− b2) > 0 for each p ∈ [2ω+ a1 + b2, 2ω + b1 + a2].25 Hence (6) is
negative for any (p2, p) ∈ P 0 as long as ω > 1γζ00 .
In case (iii), G1(p−ω−a2) = 1 and therefore (6) is equal to 1−G1(p−p2)−ωγ[2−G2(p2)−
G1(p − p2)]. For ω > 1γ this expression is smaller than G2(p2) − 1, which is negative since
μ1 = 0 implies p2 < ω + b2 in any mixed bundling strategy.
6.2 Proof of Lemma 3
Recall that since f is symmetric around 1
2
, the equality F (x) + F (1− x) = 1 holds for each
x ∈ [0, 1]. Morever, the synergy s has the same eﬀect of a reduction in p. Therefore, for
one-object sales we find
μ1 = μ2 = H(p− p1 − s)[1−H(p1)] = F (
p− p1 − s− b1 + t
2t
)[1− F (p1 − b1 + t
2t
)]
= [1− F (1− p− p1 − s− b1 + t
2t
)]F (1− p1 − b1 + t
2t
)
= [1− F (1
2
+
b2 − p+ p1
2t
)]F (
1
2
+
b1 − p1
2t
) = [1− F (x00)]F (x0)
which coincides with μAB in (4).
Regarding bundle sales we find
μ12 = 1− 2H(p− p1 − s) +H(p− p1 − s)H(p1)−
Z p1
p−p1−s
H(p− s− v1)h(v1)dv1
= 1− 2F (p− p1 − s− b1 + t
2t
) + F (
p− p1 − s− b1 + t
2t
)F (
p1 − b1 + t
2t
)
− 1
2t
Z p1
p−p1−s
F (
p− s− v1 − b1 + t
2t
)f(
v1 − b1 + t
2t
)dv1
Now use the substitution z = 1
2
+ b1−v1
2t to obtain
μ12 = 1− 2F (1− x00) + F (1− x00)F (1− x0)−
1
2t
Z x0
x00
f(1− z)F (p− b2 − b1
2t
+ z)(−2t)dz
= 1− 2[1− F (x00)] + [1− F (x00)][1− F (x0)] +
Z x0
x00
f(z)[1− F (1− z − p− b2 − b1
2t
)dz
= F (x0)F (x00) +
Z x00
x0
f(z)F (x0 + x00 − z)dz
which coincides with μAA in (4).
25Obviously, G1(p − α − a2) − G1(p − α − b2) ≥ 0, and G1(p − α − a2) − G1(p − α − b2) = 0 holds if
and only if G1(p − α − a2) = G1(p − α − b2) = 1 or G1(p − α − a2) = G1(p − α − b2) = 0. But for any
p ∈ [2α+ a1 + b2, 2α+ b1 + a2], (i) p− α− a2 > α+ a1, thus G1(p− α− a2) > 0; (ii) p− α− b2 < α+ b1,
thus G2(p− α− b2) < 1.
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6.3 Proof of Proposition 6(i)
From the proof of Proposition 5, Step 1, it follows that under identical distributions the result
in Proposition 5 holds if ω is weakly larger than the reciprocal of the minimum value of the
density. When valuations are distributed in [b1 − t, b1 + t]2 with density h(x) = 12tf(
x−b1+t
2t ),
the role of ω is played by b1 − t. However, the synergy eﬀect with value b2 − b1 needs to
be added to b1 − t, and we obtain that pure bundling dominates mixed bundling if b2 − t is
larger than the reciprocal of the minimum value of the density. Since the minimum value
of h is 1
2tf(0) (or equivalently
1
2tf(1)), we obtain the condition b2 − t >
2t
f(0) . Using b2 > α
yields finally α > t+ 2tf(0) .
6.4 Proof of Proposition 6(ii)
Using (4), for each (pA, PA) ∈MA we have
πA =
1
8t2
⎛
⎝ P
3
A + 4p
3
A − 2 (2t+ b1 + b2)P 2A − 6p2APA − 4 (2t− b2 + b1) p2A + 8 (b1 + t)PApA
+(2t2 + 4tb2 + b22 + 2b2b1 − b21)PA + 4(t− b2)(t+ b1)pA
⎞
⎠
and
∂πA
∂pA
=
1
8t2
¡
12p2A − 4 (3PA + 4t− 2b2 + 2b1) pA + 8 (b1 + t)PA + 4(t− b2)(t+ b1)
¢
∂πA
∂PA
=
1
8t2
¡
3P 2A − 4 (2t+ b1 + b2)PA − 6p2A + 8 (b1 + t) pA + 2t2 + 4tb2 + b22 + 2b2b1 − b21
¢
Likewise, for each (pB, PB) ∈MB we have
πB =
1
8t2
⎛
⎝ P
3
B + 4p
3
B − 6PBp2B − 2 (2t+ a1 + a2)P 2B − 4 (2t− a2 + a1) p2B + 8 (a1 + t)PBpB
+(2t2 + 4ta2 + a22 + 2a1a2 − a21)PB + 4 (t− a2) (a1 + t) pB
⎞
⎠
and
∂πB
∂pB
=
1
8t2
(12p2B − 4(3PB + 4t− 2a2 + 2a1)pB + 8 (a1 + t)PB + 4 (t− a2) (a1 + t))
∂πB
∂PB
=
1
8t2
¡
3P 2B − 4 (2t+ a1 + a2)PB − 6p2B + 8 (a1 + t) pB + 2t2 + 4ta2 + a22 + 2a2a1 − a21
¢
Since α ≥ t implies b1 > t, we consider the following set B of possible values for (b1, b2)
for firm A: B = {(b1, b2) : b1 > t, b1 ≤ b2 < 2t+ b1}.
Our first result refers to the case of α ≥ 1.125t, which implies b2 ≥ 1.125t. We prove
that in this case the best reply of firm A is a pure bundling strategy.
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Lemma 4 Suppose that (b1, b2) ∈ B and b2 ≥ 1.125t. Then it is never a best reply for firm
A to play (pA, PA) in MA.
Proof The proof of this lemma is organized in four steps. In Step 1 we prove that for firm
A playing independent pricing in MA is suboptimal. In Steps 2-4 we prove that there is no
(pA, PA) ∈ MA such that ∂πA∂pA =
∂πA
∂PA
= 0 and therefore no (pA, PA) ∈ MA is a best reply for
firm A. Hence firm A plays a pure bundling strategy.
Step 1 Suppose that (b1, b2) ∈ B. Playing (pA, PA) ∈ MA such that PA = 2pA is not a
best reply for firm A.
We start by evaluating ∂πA∂pA and
∂πA
∂PA
at PA = 2pA and we find
∂πA
∂pA
=
1
t2
µ
−3
2
p2A + (b2 + b1)pA −
1
2
(b2 − t) (t+ b1)
¶
≡ z(pA)
∂πA
∂PA
=
1
t2
µ
3
4
p2A − (t+ b2)pA +
1
8
¡
2b2b1 + b22 + 4tb2 + 2t
2 − b21
¢¶
≡ Z(pA)
Notice that if (pA, PA) ∈ MA, then pA ∈ (b2 − t, b1 + t). Let p∗A denote the larger solution
to z(pA) = 0, that is p∗A =
1
3
(b1 + b2 +
p
(b2 − t)2 + (b1 + t) (2t+ b1 − b2)), which satisfies
b2 − t < p∗A < b1 + t since z(b2 − t) = 12t2 (b2 − t) (2t − b2 + b1) > 0 and z(b1 + t) =
− 1
2t2 (b1 + t) (2t − b2 + b1) < 0 in B. In fact, from z(b2 − t) > 0 = z(p∗A) we infer that
z(pA) > 0 for pA ∈ (b2− t, p∗A). This implies that, starting from (pA, PA) such that PA = 2pA
and pA ∈ (b2 − t, p∗A), for A it is convenient to increase pA.
For pA ∈ [p∗A, b1 + t) we prove that Z(pA) < 0. This implies that, starting from (pA, PA)
such that PA = 2pA and pA ∈ [p∗A, b1 + t), for A it is convenient to reduce PA. We find
Z(b1 + t) = − 18t2 (b2 − b1) (2t+ b1 − b2 + 2t+ 4b1) ≤ 0 in B and
Z(p∗A) = −
(2t+ b2 − b1)
³
b2 + b1 + 4
p
(b2 − t)2 + (b1 + t) (2t+ b1 − b2)
´
− 12t2
24t2
which now we prove to be negative in B. Precisely, we define ξ1(b1, b2) ≡ (2t+ b2 − b1) (b2+
b1 + 4
p
(b2 − t)2 + (b1 + t) (2t+ b1 − b2)) and show that
ξ1(b1, b2) > 12t
2 for any (b1, b2) ∈ B (7)
To this purpose we prove below that ∂ξ1∂b2 > 0 in B, and ξ1(b1, b1) = 4t(b1+2
p
b21 + 3t2) > 12t2
for any b1 ≥ t implies (7). Precisely, ∂ξ1∂b2 = 2b2 + 2t+
6b21+8b
2
2−10b2b1+14b1t−10tb2√
(b2−t)2+(b1+t)(2t+b1−b2)
and ∂ξ1∂b2 > 0 in
B since ξ2(b1, b2) ≡ 6b21 + 8b22 − 10b2b1 + 14b1t− 10tb2 > 0 in B.26 ¥
26Since ξ2 is a convex function and B is a convex set, the first order conditions are necessary and suﬃcient
to minimize ξ2 in B. The first order conditions are satisfied at b1 = t, b2 = 54 t, with ξ2(t, 54 t) = 152 t2 > 0.
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Step 2 Suppose that (b1, b2) ∈ B. If (pA, PA) ∈ MA is such that ∂πA∂pA = 0, then PA ≥
2
3
(b1 + b2 +
p
(b1 + t)(b2 − t)).
The equation ∂πA∂pA = 0 in the unknown pA has at least a real solution if and only if PA ≤
2
3
(b1 + b2 −
p
(b1 + t)(b2 − t)) or PA ≥ 23(b1 + b2 +
p
(b1 + t)(b2 − t)). We prove that if
(pA, PA) is such that ∂πA∂pA = 0 and PA ≤
2
3
(b1 + b2 −
p
(b1 + t)(b2 − t)), then (pA, PA) /∈MA.
First notice that 2
3
(b1 + b2 −
p
(b1 + t) (b2 − t)) < b1 + b2 and then (i) at pA = PA − b2 + t
(i.e., along the south-east boundary of MA) we find ∂πA∂pA =
1
2
(b2 − t) (b1 + b2 − PA), which
is positive given PA ≤ 23(b1 + b2 −
p
(b1 + t) (b2 − t)); (ii) ∂πA∂pA is decreasing with respect
to pA for pA ≤ 12PA +
1
3
(b1 − b2) + 23t, and PA − b2 + t <
1
2
PA + 13(b1 − b2) +
2
3
t given
PA ≤ 23(b1 + b2 −
p
(b1 + t)(b2 − t)). Therefore ∂πA∂pA > 0 for each (pA, PA) ∈ MA such
that PA ≤ 23(b1 + b2 −
p
(b1 + t)(b2 − t)), and in fact for each (pA, PA) ∈ MA such that
PA < 23(b1 + b2 +
p
(b1 + t)(b2 − t)). ¥
Step 3 Suppose that (b1, b2) ∈ B. If (pA, PA) ∈MA is such that ∂πA∂PA = 0, then PA is the
smaller solution to ∂πA∂PA = 0.
The equation ∂πA∂PA = 0 is a second degree equation in PA. We prove that the larger solution,
which we denote with P 00A, is larger than 2pA for any pA ∈ (b2 − t, b1 + t). Indeed, 2pA < P 00A
reduces to27q
10t2 + 16tb1 + 4b2t+ 7b21 + 2b2b1 + b22 + 18p2A − 24pAb1 − 24pAt > 6pA−4t−2b1−2b2 (8)
which is trivially satisfied if pA ≤ 23t+
1
3
b1 + 13b2. If instead pA >
2
3
t+ 1
3
b1 + 13b2, then (8) is
equivalent to
w(pA) ≡ −18p2A + (24t+ 24b2) pA − 6t2 − 12b2t− 3b22 − 6b2b1 + 3b21 > 0 (9)
If b2 < 52t+
1
2
b1, then 23t+
1
3
b2+ 13b1 belongs to the interval (b2−t, b1+t) and (9) is satisfied since
w(2
3
t+ 1
3
b2+ 13b1) = 2 (b2 + t)
2+(b2 − b1)2 > 0 and w(b1+ t) = 3 (5b1 + 4t− b2) (b2 − b1) ≥ 0
in B. If b2 ≥ 52t+ 12b, then (9) is satisfied since w(b1 + t) ≥ 0 (seen above) and w(b2 − t) =
3b22 + 24b2t − 48t2 − 6b2b1 + 3b21 > 0 since b2 ≥ 52t +
1
2
b1 (given b1 ≥ t) implies b2 ≥ 3t and
therefore 3b22 + 24b2t− 48t2 − 6b2b1 + 3b21 ≥ 51t2 − 18b1t+ 3b21, which is positive for each b1.
¥
27The argument of the square root is minimized at pA = 23b1 +
2
3 t, with value 2t
2 +4tb2 − b21 +2b2b1 + b22,
and it is positive in B since it is increasing in b2 and at b2 = b1 it has value 2b21 + 4b1t + 2t2 > 0 for each
b1 ≥ t.
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Step 4 Suppose that (b1, b2) ∈ B. If b2 ≥ 1.125t, then the smaller solution to ∂πA∂PA = 0 is
smaller than 2
3
(b1 + b2 +
p
(b1 + t)(b2 − t)), thus ∂πA∂pA =
∂πA
∂PA
= 0 cannot hold in MA.
It suﬃces to prove that ∂πA∂PA < 0 at PA =
2
3
(b1 + b2 +
p
(b1 + t) (b2 − t)) for b2 ≥ 1.125t. At
PA = 23(b1 + b2 +
p
(b1 + t) (b2 − t)) we find
∂πA
∂PA
= − 3
4t2
p2A+
b1 + t
t2
pA+
2b2b1 − 7b21 − b22 − 20tb1 + 2t2 − 16t
p
(b2 − t) (b1 + t)
24t2
≡W (pA)
and we prove that W (pA) < 0 for each pA ∈ (b2− t, b1+ t). W is maximized with respect to
pA at pA = max{23t+ 23b1, b2 − t} =
⎧
⎨
⎩
b2 − t if b2 > 23b1 +
5
3
t
2
3
t+ 2
3
b1 if b2 ≤ 23b1 +
5
3
t
.
• If b2 ≤ 23b1+ 53t, then b1 ≤ 5t needs to hold in order to satisfy b2 ≥ b1, andW (23t+ 23b1) =
1
t2 (
5
12
t2−1
6
b1t− 124b22+
1
12
b2b1+ 124b
2
1−23t
p
(b1 + t) (b2 − t)) ≡ ξ3(b1, b2), which is decreasing
in b2. For b1 ∈ (t, 1.125t], ξ3(b1, 1.125t) = 1t2 (
5
12
t2 − 1
6
b1t− 124(1.125t)2 +
1
12
(1.125t)b1 +
1
24
b21− 23t
p
(t+ b1) (1.125− 1) t) is negative; for b1 ∈ (1.125t, 5t], ξ3(b1, b1) = 112t2 (5t2−
2tb1 + b21 − 8t
p
b21 − t2) is negative.
• If b2 > 23b1+ 53t, then we evaluateW (b2− t) = 124t2 (60b2t+26b2b1−40t2−19b22−44tb1−
7b21 − 16t
p
(b2 − t) (b1 + t)) and we prove it is negative. Precisely, we show that
ξ4(b1, b2) ≡ 16t
p
(b2 − t) (b1 + t)− 60b2t− 26b2b1 + 40t2 + 19b22 + 44tb1 + 7b21 > 0
We show below that ∂ξ4∂b2 > 0, and it is simple to verify that ξ4(b1,
2
3
b1 + 53t) = −
17
9
b21 +¡
16
3
√
6 + 26
9
¢
tb1+(163
√
6− 65
9
)t2 > 0 for b1 ∈ [t, 5t] and ξ4(b1, b1) = 8t 20b1t−29t
2
2
√
b21−t2+2b1−5t
> 0
for b1 > 5t. Regarding
∂ξ4
∂b2
= 8t
q
b1+t
b2−t + 38b2 − 26b1 − 60t, since b2 ≥ b1 it follows
that ∂ξ4∂b2 ≥ 8t
q
b1+t
b2−t + 12b1 − 60t > 0 if b1 ≥ 5t. For b1 < 5t notice that
∂2ξ4
∂b22
=
38 − 4t(b1+t)1/2
(b2−t)3/2 , which is positive given b2 >
2
3
b1 + 53t. Since at b2 =
2
3
b1 + 53t we have
∂ξ4
∂b2
= 4t
√
6 + 10
3
t− 2
3
b1 > 0 given b1 < 5t, we conclude that
∂ξ4
∂b2
> 0. ¥
Next two lemmas refer to the case of α ∈ [t, 1.125t). In this case we cannot rule out that
the best reply of firm A is a mixed bundling strategy, but taking into account the behavior
of firm B we can still prove that no mixed bundling NE exists.
Lemma 5 Suppose that (b1, b2) ∈ B and b2 < 1.125t. If (pA, PA) ∈ MA is a best reply for
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A, then
4
3
t ≤ pA ≤ 1.589t (10)
4
3
t ≤ PA ≤ 1.832t (11)
Proof Step 1 Suppose that (pA, PA) ∈MA is a best reply for A. Then
p∗A ≤ pA ≤
1
3
(2t+ 2b1 +
p
(b2 − t) (b1 + t)) (12)
with p∗A =
1
3
(b1 + b2 +
p
(b2 − t)2 + (b1 + t) (2t+ b1 − b2)).
First notice that ∂πA∂pA is a convex second degree polynomial in pA and therefore only the
smaller solution of ∂πA∂pA = 0 may be an optimum for A. In order to prove (12) we verify that
∂πA
∂pA
≥ 0 at pA = p∗A and ∂πA∂pA ≤ 0 at pA =
1
3
(2t+ 2b1 +
p
(b2 − t) (b1 + t)).
At pA = p∗A we find
∂πA
∂pA
=
1
2t2
³
2t+ b1 − b2 −
p
(b2 − t)2 + (b1 + t) (2t+ b1 − b2)
´
PA
−1
3
(b2 − t)
3t+ b1 − 2b2 − 2
p
(b2 − t)2 + (b1 + t) (2t+ b1 − b2)
t2
This expression is nonnegative since it is decreasing in PA (given that 2t + b1 − b2 <p
(b2 − t)2 + (b1 + t) (2t+ b1 − b2) in B) and it is zero at PA = 2p∗A, the highest value for PA
given pA = p∗A.
At pA = 13(2t+ 2b1 +
p
(b2 − t)(b1 + t)) we find
∂πA
∂pA
= − 1
2t2
p
(b2 − t) (b1 + t)PA +
1
3
(b2 − t) (b1 + t) + (b2 + b1)
p
(b2 − t) (b1 + t)
t2
This expression is negative or zero since it decreasing in PA and it is zero at PA = 23(b1 +
b2 +
p
(b1 + t) (b2 − t)) [recall from Step 2 in the proof of Lemma 1 that ∂πA∂pA = 0 implies
PA ≥ 23(b1 + b2 +
p
(b1 + t) (b2 − t))]. ¥
Step 2 Suppose that (pA, PA) ∈MA is a best reply for A. Then
2
3
(b1+b2+
p
(b1 + t) (b2 − t)) ≤ PA ≤
1
3
(4t+2b1+2b2−
q
2t2 + 4b2t+ b22 + 2b2b1 − b21) (13)
We know that 2
3
(b1 + b2 +
p
(b1 + t) (b2 − t)) ≤ PA from Step 2 in the proof of Lemma 1.
Furthermore, from Step 3 in the proof of Lemma 1 we know that if (pA, PA) ∈ MA satisfies
∂πA
∂PA
= 0, then PA is the smaller solution to this equation. Such a solution is maximized
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with respect to pA if the expression −6p2A + 8 (b1 + t) pA in ∂πA∂PA is maximized, that is at
pA = 23t +
2
3
b1. For this value of pA the smaller solution of ∂πA∂PA = 0 is
1
3
(4t + 2b2 + 2b1 −p
2t2 + 4b2t+ b22 + 2b2b1 − b21) and therefore (13) is proved. ¥
Step 3 Proof of (10)-(11).
The lower bound and the upper bound for pA in (12) are both increasing in b1, b2, thus
(b1, b2) ∈ B and b2 < 1.125t imply (10). The same argument applies to (13) and yields (11).
¥
Lemma 6 If α ∈ [t, 1.125t), then no mixed bundling NE exists.
Proof If a mixed bundling NE exists, when α ∈ [t, 1.125t), then we can use Lemma 2 to
derive upper and lower bounds for a1 and a2 and we obtain
−1.381t ≤ a1 ≤ −0.5t, 0.208t ≤ a2 ≤ 0.589t
If a1 ≤ −t, then MB = ∅ and firm B necessarily plays a pure bundling strategy, thus we
define A = {(a1, a2) : a1 ∈ [−t,−0.5t], a2 ∈ [0.208t, 0.589t]} and we prove that for any
(a1, a2) ∈ A, the best reply of firm B is either a pure bundling strategy, or PB = 2pB with
pB > 0.125t. This implies that b2 > 0.125t, and therefore Lemma 1 applies to rule out that
a best reply for A belongs to MA.
Step 1 Suppose that (a1, a2) ∈ A. If (pB, PB) ∈ MB and pB > p∗B ≡ 13(a1 + a2 +p
(a2 − t)2 + (a1 + t) (2t+ a1 − a2)), then ∂πB∂pB < 0. Thus no interior point in MB such that
pB > p∗B is a best reply for B.
We prove that (i) ∂πB∂pB ≤ 0 at pB = p
∗
B, for any PB ≤ 2p∗B; (ii) ∂πB∂pB ≤ 0 at pB = a1 + t for
any PB ∈ [a1 + a2, 2a1 + 2t]; (iii) ∂πB∂pB ≤ 0 at pB = PB + t− a2, for PB ∈ [0, a1 + a2).
At pB = p∗B we find
∂πB
∂pB
= 1
2t2
³
2t+ a1 − a2 −
p
(a2 − t)2 + (a1 + t) (2t+ a1 − a2)
´
PB +
1
3
(t− a2)
3t−2a2+a1−2
√
(a2−t)2+(a1+t)(2t+a1−a2)
t2 , which is negative or zero as it is increasing in
PB (because 2t + a1 − a2 −
p
(a2 − t)2 + (a1 + t) (2t+ a1 − a2) > 0 in A) and is zero at
PB = 2p∗B. At pB = a1 + t,
∂πB
∂pB
= − 1
2t2 (a1 + t) (PB − a1 − a2) ≤ 0 since PB ≥ a1 + a2. At
pB = PB + t− a2, ∂πB∂pB = −
1
2t2 (t− a2) (a1 + a2 − PB) < 0 since PB < a1 + a2. ¥
Step 2 Suppose that (a1, a2) ∈ A. If (pB, PB) ∈MB and pB ≤ p∗B, then ∂πB∂PB > 0. Thus
no interior point in MB such that pB ≤ p∗B is a best reply for B.
At PB = 2pB we have ∂πB∂PB =
3
4t2p
2
B− t+a2t2 pB+
1
8t2 (a2+ t)
2+ 1
8t2 (a1+ t)(t+2a2−a1) ≡ U(pB)
and we prove below that U(pB) > 0 for pB ≤ p∗B. Since ∂πB∂PB is decreasing with respect to PB
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for PB ≤ 23(a1 + a2 + 2t) and 2p∗B <
2
3
(a1 + a2 + 2t), the result below suﬃces to prove the
claim of Step 2.
It is simple to see that U is decreasing in pB for pB < 23(a2+t) and p
∗
B <
2
3
(a2+t). Hence it suf-
fices to show that U(p∗B) =
1
24t2 (12t
2−(2t+ a2 − a1)
³
a1 + a2 + 4
p
(a2 − t)2 + (a1 + t) (2t+ a1 − a2)
´
).
We define ξ5(a1, a2) ≡ 12t2−(2t+ a2 − a1)
³
a1 + a2 + 4
p
(a2 − t)2 + (a1 + t) (2t+ a1 − a2)
´
and prove that
ξ5(a1, a2) > 0 for each (a1, a2) ∈ A (14)
In order to prove (14) we show below that ∂ξ5∂a1 is negative in A. This implies that ξ5 is
decreasing with respect to a1 and therefore, for each (a1, a2) ∈ A, ξ5(a1, a2) > ξ5(−0.5t, a2) $
53
4
t2−2a2t−a22−(5t+2a2)
p
4a22 − 10a2t+ 7t2, which is positive for each a2 ∈ [0.208t, 0.589t].
Regarding ∂ξ5∂a1 =
10a1t−14a2t+8a21+6a22−10a1a2√
(a2−t)2+(a1+t)(2t+a1−a2)
−2 (t− a1), we prove it is negative in A by showing
that ξ6(a1, a2) ≡ 10a1t− 14a2t+ 8a21 + 6a22 − 10a1a2 < 0 in A. Since ξ6 is a convex function
and A is a rectangle, ξ6 is maximized at one of the corner points of the rectangle. Given
that ξ6(−t, 0.208t) = −2.572t2, ξ6(−t, 0.588t) = −2.278t2, ξ6(−0.502t, 0.208t) = −4.612t2,
and ξ6(−0.502t, 0.588t) = −6.21t2 we infer that ξ6(a1, a2) < 0 in A. ¥
Step 3 Suppose that (a1, a2) ∈ A. Then B’s best reply is either a pure bundling strategy
or pB =
2a1t+2a2t−a21+a22+4t2
8t−4a1+4a2 , PB = 2pB, with pB > 0.125t.
From Steps 1-2 it follows that if B’s best reply is in MB, then it is such that PB = 2pB.
Under this equality πB = − 12t2 (2t+ a2 − a1) p2B +
1
4t2 (2a1t+ 4t
2 + 2a2t+ a22 − a21) pB for
pB ∈ [0, a1 + t]. If ξ7(a1, a2) ≡ 4t2 + 2a1t + 2a2t − 3a21 − a22 + 4a1a2 ≤ 0, then πB is
maximized at pB = a1 + t, which means that B plays a pure bundling strategy. If instead
ξ7(a1, a2) > 0, then πB is maximized at pB =
2a1t+2a2t−a21+a22+4t2
4(2t+a2−a1) > 0, included in (0, a1+t). In
the latter case we show that 2a1t+2a2t−a
2
1+a
2
2+4t
2
4(2t+a2−a1) > 0.125t, which is equivalent to ξ8(a1, a2) ≡
−2a21 + 5a1t + 2a22 + 3a2t + 6t2 > 0. We prove that, given (a1, a2) in A, ξ7(a1, a2) > 0
implies ξ8(a1, a2) > 0. Precisely, ξ7(a1, a2) > 0 requires a1 > − 910t because ξ7 is increasing
in a1 and ξ7(− 910t, a2) = −a22 −
8
5
a2t − 23100t2 < 0. However, also ξ8 is increasing in a1 and
a1 > − 910t implies ξ8(a1, a2) > ξ8(−
9
10
t, a2) = 2a22 + 3a2t − 325t2, which is positive for any
a2 ∈ [0.208t, 0.589t].
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Figure 1: (Cumulative) density functions for the uniform case. The thicker (blue) graphs
correspond to average valuations (bundling).
α higher than the product of firm B. At prices pA and pB, the indifferent consumer is
located at
x(α, pA, pB) =
1
2
+ σ(α− pA + pB), (1)
where σ = 1/(2t) and t denotes the transportation cost (per unit of distance) in the
Hotelling model. For clarity we will often suppress the arguments and simply write x for
the location of the indifferent consumer.
1.2 Competition between generalists: Independent Pricing
We consider two generalists who each produce two products. Firm A has an advantage α
in each market. Moreover, the distribution function of consumer’s valuations are assumed
to be identical for both products. Hence the equilibrium prices in both markets will be
the same, and we here only need to solve for the equilibrium in one of the markets. We
will assume that distributions and parameters are such that independent pricing leads
to an interior equilibrium (defined by first-order conditions) in which both firms obtain
positive market share. Since marginal costs are assumed to be zero, the profit functions
are
piA = pAF (x) and piB = pB(1− F (x)).
The first-order conditions are
0 = F (x)− σpAf(x),
0 = 1− F (x)− σpBf(x).
The necessary second-order conditions are
−2σf(x) + σ2pAf ′(x) ≤ 0
2
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Figure 2: Equilibrium market shares, prices and profits for firm A (left panel) and firm
A (right panel) as a function of α. The thicker (blue) line corresponds to bundling.
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